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Agenda
Human Factors in Ground Processing
 Introduction
 Managing risk in human systems
 Contributing risks: design, environment, process
 Example: STS-93 wire anomaly 
 Design risks
 Environment risks
 Process risks
 Human systems issues
 Summary
Managing Risk in Human Systems
 HUMAN SYSTEMS
 Individual / Teams
 Skills & knowledge
 Leadership
 Team complement
 Work practices
 Organizations
 Training
 Controls
 Resources
 Workforce
 DESIGN RISK
 Hardware / Software
 ENVIRONMENT RISK
 Workplace / Conditions 
/ Hazards
 PROCESS  RISK
 Procedures / Policies / 
Resources
Focus on the human interfacesFocus on the hu an interfaces
Managing Risk in Human Systems
 DESIGN
 Is damage visible?
 Is there access to the 
work area?
 ENVIRONMENT
 Is there adequate space, 
lighting?
 Is PPE required?
 PROCESS
 Are resources, controls 
adequate?
 Are work procedures 
usable, up-to-date?
 Do teams communicate/ 
coordinate appropriately?
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STS-93   JULY 23, 1999
 Five seconds after lift-off, one 
of two redundant main engine 
controllers on two of the three 
engines shut down due to 
power fluctuation (later found 
to be due to wire arcing).  
 OUTCOME: The redundant 
controllers on those two 
engines -- center and right 
main engines -- functioned 
normally allowing them to fully 
support Columbia’s climb to 
orbit
A damaged wire found during wiring inspections in 
Columbia's payload bay following STS-93, caused a 
short circuit in two separate main engine controllers 
on launch.
An orbiter has more than 300 miles of wires 
such as these shown in the cable tray.
Wiring In-Flight Anomaly:              
Basic Findings
 Inspection revealed a single 
14 ga. polyimide wire had arced
to a burred screw head; located 
in the aft left-hand mid-body 
bay #11 lower wire tray.
 Wiring in the mid-body payload bay normally 
covered; records indicate covers last removed 
during Orbiter Maintenance Down Period 
(OMDP) 4 years earlier in the Palmdale depot 
facility.
Wiring In-Flight Anomaly: 
Root Cause
 Root cause
Work-induced collateral damage
No evidence of generic chafing exists (not 
simply fair wear-and-tear)
Wire protection specification applied 
inconsistently
 Therefore, assessments focused on 
maintenance practices.
Wiring In-Flight Anomaly: 
Assessments
 Review the Space Shuttle systems and 
maintenance practices… look at NASA practices, 
Shuttle anomalies, and civilian and military 
experience. (NASA)
 Identify strengths and weaknesses in shuttle 
processing, compare shuttle processing to 
commercial aviation best practices, make 
suggestions to reduce Ground-Processing-Induced 
In-Flight Anomaly (GPI-IFA) risk   (USA)
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/osf/shuttle_assess.html
HUMAN SYSTEM Issues
 INDIVIDUAL RISKS: Ground personnel 
expected to perform “error-free” and in 
compliance with procedures
Not aware of the in-fight consequences 
of ground-processing-induced “errors”
Downsized workforce under strain
 TEAM-LEVEL RISKS: KSC team and 
Palmdale processing teams have different 
standards
Wire inspection criteria need redefinition 
TECHNICAL Issues: Wiring System
 DESIGN RISKS
Maximum feasible separation of redundant 
systems (e.g., redundancy of circuits 
compromised by placement in same wire 
bundle)
 Identification of single point failures
Over time and modifications, additional wire 
protection for critical systems (e.g., wire tray 
covers become hard to close) 
TECHNICAL Issues: Wiring System
 WORK ENVIRONMENT RISKS
Extensive wiring inspection, repair
High traffic area?
Access to work area?
Damage visible?
TECHNICAL Issues: Wiring System
 PROCESS RISKS
Managed through certification, skill, procedural 
control, inspection, teaming and continuous 
reinforcement of safety awareness
 Little emphasis on error reporting, 
management, and understanding of why 
workmanship errors occur
 Line employees should be aware of 
relationship between workmanship/test errors 
and GPI-IFAs
Summary
 Risk Management in Human Systems 
applies to:
 Individuals 
Teams
Organizations
 Risk Contributors to Human Systems are:
Design risks
Work Environment risks
Process risks
Summary 
 Apply Lessons Learned to future programs
Maintain a realistic attitude toward risky 
operations
Develop a better understanding of the risk of 
Ground-Processing-Induced In-Flight 
Anomalies
Expand corrective actions beyond specific, 
technical fixes
Fit solutions to the risks: design risks are not 
well-solved by process solutions
Thank You
